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Abstract
Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration,
states in his memoir that during the Second World War, the United States sought
to build China up “as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three big
Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States.” Francis Spellman, the
Archbishop of New York, wrote in a memorandum, as a record of a conversation
with Roosevelt in 1943, “It is planned to make an agreement among the Big
Four. Accordingly, the world will be divided into spheres of influence: China
gets the Far East; the U.S. the Pacific; Britain and Russia, Europe and Africa.”
This paper examines Rooseveltʼs postwar vision of East Asia and clarifies that
neither Hullʼs memoir nor Spellmanʼs memorandum reflects Rooseveltʼs plan
accurately. It is true that Roosevelt sought to make China one of “the Big Four.”
However, he positioned it not as an equal but a junior partner that, he expected,
would support the United States in maintaining international order of East Asia.
This paper argues that Rooseveltʼs postwar vision was to make East Asia an
American sphere of influence and expand American hegemony
geographically̶from the Western Hemisphere through the Pacific to East Asia.
1. Introduction
The Secretary of State in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, Cordell
Hull, states in his memoir that the United States had two objectives vis-à-vis China
during the Second World War:
The first was an effective joint prosecution of the war. The second was the recognition
and building up of China as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three big
Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States, during and after the war, both
for the preparation of a postwar organization and for the establishment of stability and
prosperity in the Orient.1)
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While the first objective is a matter of course, the second is notable. When the
United States entered the Second World War in 1941, China was still not
recognized as a full sovereign country worldwide, plagued by the unequal treaty
system established in the wake of the Opium War. The United States was one of
the countries that enjoyed special privileges in China under this system. During the
Second World War, however, the Roosevelt administration sought to give China
international status not only as a full sovereign country but also as a major power
or a great power. Hull explains the logic behind the second objective as follows:
It was obvious to me that Japan would disappear as a great Oriental power for a long
time to come. Therefore, the only major strictly Oriental power would be China. The
United States, Britain, and Russia were also Pacific powers, but the greater interests of
each were elsewhere. Consequently, if there was ever to be stability in the Far East, it
had to be assured with China at the center of any arrangement that was made.2)
This explanation is supported by Rooseveltʼs alleged remark to Francis
Spellman, the Archbishop of New York, who was invited to the White House in
September 1943. A memorandum in Spellmanʼs files entitled “Here are a few
outstanding points of the conversation” stated the following:
[I]t is planned to make an agreement among the Big Four. Accordingly the world will
be divided into spheres of influence: China gets the Far East; the U.S. the Pacific;
Britain and Russia, Europe and Africa.3)
Historian Alonzo Hamby accepts this description and adds that in Rooseveltʼs
mind, the United States was to get “presumably the Western Hemisphere” as well
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as the Pacific.4)
This paper examines Rooseveltʼs postwar vision of East Asia and argues that
neither Hullʼs memoir nor Spellmanʼs memorandum conveys it accurately. It is
true that Rooseveltʼs vision put China on an equal footing in form with “the three
big Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States,” enabling it to gain a
permanent seat of the U.N. Security Council. However, he did not mean to allow
China to get East Asia because he envisioned the region not as a Chinese but an
American sphere of influence, at least in the short term. From this standpoint,
China was positioned as a junior partner that was required to support the American
de facto domination of East Asia.
Although some previous studies have already pointed out that Roosevelt
regarded China as a junior partner,5) they have paid less attention to his ambition
vis-à-vis East Asia. As is well known, the United States had already become the
dominant power in the Western Hemisphere in the early 20th century. Rooseveltʼs
postwar plan aimed to expand American hegemony geographically̶from the
Western Hemisphere all the way up to East Asia.
2. Good Neighbor Policy and Rooseveltʼs Postwar Vision
To understand Rooseveltʼs postwar plan, it should first be noted that
American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere changed in its form during the
1930s under the so-called good neighbor policy. For decades before the 1930s, the
United States carried out repeated military interventions in Latin American countries,
either to build up or protect pro-American regimes there. As the Under Secretary
of the Navy in the Woodrow Wilson administration, Roosevelt was one of the
officials who fervently advocated military interventions in neighboring countries.6)
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Not surprisingly, these interventions induced savage hostility among Latin
Americans and even triggered large-scale anti-American resistance movements in
some countries. By the time Roosevelt was sworn in as President in March 1933, it
had become clear that military intervention would not enhance but hurt American
national interests in the Western Hemisphere. Along with this realization, there was
a pervasive feeling in the United States that it should avoid engaging in costly
foreign endeavors, and instead invest effort in rehabilitating the American economy
that had been decimated during the Great Depression.
In his inaugural address, therefore, Roosevelt declared that he would dedicate
the United States “to the policy of the good neighbor,”7) and then took a clear
stance of opposing military intervention abroad. In August 1933, he entered into an
agreement with the Haitian government to withdraw American military forces that
had occupied Haiti since 1915. In December, at the seventh inter-American
conference held in Montevideo, Uruguay, Hull represented the United States and
signed the Convention of Rights and Duties of States, which stipulates that “[n]o
state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”8) The
following year, the Roosevelt administration finalized a treaty with the Cuban
government, abolishing the so-called Platt Amendment, which had given the
United States legal authority to intervene in Cuban internal affairs since the early
20th century.
Though these were remarkable achievements, ending military interventionism
was not enough to be a good neighbor. The Roosevelt administration also had to
abolish American economic protectionism that deprived Latin American countries
of a huge and geographically natural market. American economic protectionism
had a long history since the birth of the nation and hit a peak with the enactment of
the so-called Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, just three years before Roosevelt
became President. It was expected that the Act would help the American economy
recover after the Great Depression, but it actually worsened it by causing the
stagnation of world trade. Roosevelt was aware of the problem of course, but
initially took a cautious attitude to the tariff issue because it was a politically
sensitive one in which various domestic interests were complicatedly involved. In
his inaugural address, Roosevelt said, “[o]ur international trade relations, though
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vastly important, are in point of time and necessity secondary to the establishment
of a sound national economy.”9)
It was Hull who became a main promoter of free trade in the Roosevelt
administration. He overrode Rooseveltʼs reluctance and, at the Montevideo
Conference, presented a proposal titled “Economic, Commercial, and Tariff
Policy.” It stipulates that the governments of the American Republics would
“reduce high trade barriers through the negotiation of comprehensive bilateral
reciprocity treaties based upon mutual concessions.”10)
Hullʼs proposal gained favorable responses from the Latin American delegates
and was unanimously adopted. It also won positive reactions from the American
press. As a politician who was shrewd enough to notice a shift in public opinion,
Roosevelt sent a message to Congress in March 1934, requesting authority to
negotiate trade agreements with other countries. This request materialized in June
as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which an economist calls “a landmark
law that bisects the history of U.S. trade law.”11) It granted the President authority
to reduce tariffs by up to 50 percent in trade agreements with foreign countries.
With an unconditional most-favored nation clause, it also made it possible to apply
negotiated tariff reductions to imports from all over the world.
Starting with the finalization of a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba in
August 1934, the Roosevelt administration signed a series of agreements one after
another. Until the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the United States
finalized reciprocal trade agreements with a total of 21 countries, including 11
Latin American ones (the others were Canada, Turkey, and eight European
nations).
The tariff reduction, along with the non-intervention policy, softened anti-
American feelings in Latin American countries, enabling the Roosevelt
administration to take the initiative to create a new peace regime with them. In
January 1936, Roosevelt sent letters to the presidents of all Latin American
countries and proposed a special conference “to determine how the maintenance of
peace among the American republics may best be safeguarded.”12)
OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 68 (February 2021) 43
9) Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, in The Years of Crisis, 1933, p.14.
10) Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh International
Conference of American States, Department of State, Conference Series 19 (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1934), p.196.
11) Sasaki Takao, America no Tsusyō Seisaku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), p.56.
12) Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS): 1936 5 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1954), p.4.
Among the American Republics, there had already existed international
schemes to solve disputes peacefully through mechanisms such as arbitration and
conciliation. These, however, had proved inefficient in stopping the recurrence of
armed conflicts. One of the most serious conflicts was the Chaco War erupted in
1933 between Paraguay and Bolivia over the Chaco Boreal. By the time the two
countries entered into a ceasefire agreement in June 1935, the territorial war had
cost them more than 100,000 casualties, and devastated their economies. Thus, it
was obvious that more efficient peace mechanisms were needed.
Rooseveltʼs proposal of a special inter-American conference also stemmed
from his concern about European international situations. In Germany, Adolf Hitler
and the Nazi party were rising, shaking the so-called Versailles system founded in
the wake of the First World War. In Italy, Mussolini gained power and strained
European societies by invading Ethiopia in 1935. The League of Nations failed to
cope with these international crises, as in the case of the Manchurian Incident of
1931 – 33. Roosevelt was worried that the collapse of European international order
would threaten the Western Hemisphere again, as it had during the First World
War.13)
His special inter-American conference proposal was unanimously accepted by
Latin American countries, and was realized in December 1936 with Argentina as
the host country. During the three weeks of its sessions at Buenos Aires, the
conference adopted 11 treaties and conventions and 62 resolutions and declarations.
The most significant among them is the Convention for the Maintenance,
Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace. Hailed by Hull as “the strongest
assurance of peace which this continent has ever had,”14) it established in
contractual form the obligation to consult together whenever peace of the American
Republics was threatened.15)
It, however, had a shortcoming in that it did not provide any machinery for
consultation. At the Buenos Aires Conference, Hull proposed the establishment of
“a permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee” comprising foreign
ministers of the American Republics.16) However, this proposal faced strong
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objection from the Argentine delegation. According to Sumner Welles, Assistant
Secretary of the State for Latin American affairs, Argentina was concerned that a
regional political institution would enable the United States and Brazil to “develop
sufficient influence to check Argentinaʼs traditional attempt to assert the right to
speak for the other Spanish-American republics of South America.”17)
Subsequently, however, the Argentine attitude softened to some extent; at the
eighth inter-American conference at Lima, Peru, in December 1938, it was decided
that “the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, when deemed
desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals
by rotation and without protocolary character.”18) It can be said that this decision
effectively fulfilled the American proposal of a permanent Inter-American
Consultative Committee at Buenos Aires. After the Second World War began in
1939, three foreign ministerial meetings were held in succession by 1942, creating
a joint defense regime in the Western Hemisphere.
The development of regional order in the Western Hemisphere, along with the
malfunction of the League of Nations, became a key factor in Rooseveltʼs
emphasis on a regional approach in his postwar vision. In fact, Spellmanʼs
memorandum is correct in that it indicates the regional roles of great powers.
According to Roosevelt, great powers needed to adopt the American good neighbor
policy as a model and, in each region, take the initiative to establish a stable and
open international order after the example of the Western Hemisphere. At the
Tehran Conference in November – December 1943, Roosevelt recommended the
good neighbor policy directly to then Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin as a “policy for
strong powers paramount in their regions,” such as the United States in the New
World and the Soviet Union in Eastern and Northern Europe.19)
As Spellmanʼs memorandum implies, Roosevelt did not regard France as a
great power that should strive to create a stable and open postwar world. When he
was asked about the possibility of establishing “France as a great power” by Soviet
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, who visited Washington D.C. in the middle
of 1942, he ambiguously replied, “that might perhaps be possible within 10 or 20
years.”20)
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Although he had close relatives in France and felt familiar with its culture,
Roosevelt was deeply disappointed that France had quickly succumbed to German
military pressures and allowed Japanese troops to enter its Asian colony,
Indochina, a strategically important place to defend the Philippines and other
Southeast Asian regions. He also had bad chemistry with Charles De Gaulle, the
leader of “Free France.”21) For these reasons, he not only took a negative stance
against the resurgence of France as a great power, the international status De
Gaulle coveted, but also made it the main target of his anti-colonial policy.
In terms of the size of population and territory, geographical location, and war
efforts, it was Brazil that Roosevelt considered appropriate to join “a great power
club” with the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. Under
Rooseveltʼs directive, the American delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference
in 1944 called upon British and Soviet representatives to recognize Brazil as a
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Rooseveltʼs commitment to the
proposal was so strong that despite the opposition of the two countries, he did not
readily withdraw it. Even after agreeing to its withdrawal, he sought to include in
the Dumbarton Oaks proposal a provision to allow other countries to be added as
permanent members. This attempt also failed.22)
That said, according to Roosevelt, Brazil was a great power that would strive
for the maintenance of the international order of the Western Hemisphere with the
United States; it was also to take the responsibility of maintaining peace of the
African continent with Britain (in this regard, Spellmanʼs memorandum is
wrong).23)
Roosevelt well knew that Brazil could not be indifferent to the African
continent because of its geographical proximity. At the same time, he also
understood that Brazilʼs national power would not be enough to deal with African
problems. Therefore, he planned to set up a military base in Dakar (Senegal) after
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denying the French colonial control and station American troops there.24)
According to a postwar military base plan (JCS570/2) prepared by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and approved by Roosevelt in January 1944, the United States was
to establish military bases in South America, too.25) This implies that Roosevelt did
not believe Brazil had enough capability to maintain an international order even of
its own region.
After all, Brazil was not an equal but a junior partner for Roosevelt. This
means that in his postwar plan, great powers were divided into two groups̶first-
ranking powers and second-ranking powers. As discussed later, China, along with
Brazil, was a second-ranking power according to Roosevelt.
Because of his emphasis on the regional approach, Roosevelt initially took a
negative stance on the establishment of a universal international organization. At
the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, he did not accept British Prime Minister
Winston Churchillʼs proposal that the United States and United Kingdom “seek a
peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective
international organization will afford to all States and peoples the means of
dwelling in security within their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans
without fear of lawless assault or need of getting burdensome armaments.”26) The
following year, he recalled the Atlantic Conference in a meeting with Molotov and
said that although “Mr. Churchill had expressed some idea of reestablishing a post-
war international organization which was in effect a revived League of Nations,”
he had given him his own opinion that “such an organization would be impractical,
because too many nations would be involved.”27)
Public opinion surveys conducted after the United Statesʼ entry into the
Second World War showed that in contrast with Roosevelt, the majority of
American people favored the establishment of a universal international
organization.28) Congress reacted enthusiastically to such public opinion in
1943̶the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively passed, by a wide
margin, a resolution endorsing the creation of a universal international organization
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and American participation in it.29)
Pressured by American public opinion and Congress, Roosevelt changed his
attitude and allowed a U.S.-British-Soviet foreign ministersʼ conference, which was
held in Moscow in October 1943, to issue a declaration about a postwar
international organization by adding the signature of the Chinese ambassador to the
Soviet Union. The declaration stated that “they recognize the necessity of
establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization,
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open
to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of
international peace and security.”30)
At the Tehran Conference held the following month, Roosevelt himself
proposed to Stalin a world-wide international organization plan, which had been
drafted by the State Department. The organization would have three organs. The
first was a general assembly comprising all member states, and the second “an
executive committee composed of the Soviet Union, the United States, United
Kingdom and China, together with two additional European states, one South
America, one Near East, one Far Eastern country, and one British Dominion”;
according to Roosevelt, “[t]his Executive Committee would deal with all non-
military questions such as agriculture, food, health, and economic questions, as
well as the setting up of an International Committee.” The third organ was termed
“The Four Policemen.” Comprising the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet
Union, and China, it “would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to
the peace and any sudden emergency which requires this action.”31)
As this remark shows, Rooseveltʼs postwar vision for great powers was to be
incorporated into a plan for a universal international organization. This means that,
institutionally, the four great powers would be jointly responsible for world problems.
As is evident from his conversation with Stalin in Tehran, however, Roosevelt did
not completely give up pursuing his regional approach. During the conversation,
Stalin pointed out that “the world organization suggested by the President, and in
particular the Four Policemen, might also require the sending of American troops to
Europe.” Roosevelt responded that “he had only envisaged the sending of American
planes and ships to Europe, and that England and the Soviet Union would have to
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handle the land armies in the event of any future threat to the peace.”32)
Historian Warren F. Kimball argues that “[c]rucial to any understanding of
FDRʼs postwar vision is his consistent emphasis on the regional role of each of the
policemen.”33) Although Kimball barely examines Rooseveltʼs vision of making
China as one of the policemen, his argument applies to it.
3. Chinaʼs Regional Roles
The first regional role expected of China was to monitor postwar Japan. In
March 1943, Roosevelt said to British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden that “China
might become a very useful power in the Far East to help police Japan and that he
wanted to strengthen China in every possible way.”34)
The second regional role was to temporally administer the Korean Peninsula
that was to be put under international trusteeship after the war. Likewise, China
would become a trustee of the European colonies in Southeast Asia.
On the latter, Roosevelt often mentioned during the Second World War how
severe European colonialism had been.35) However, he did not take a negative
stance on not only the Japanese colonies but also the European colonies merely
because of his sympathy toward oppressed peoples. A strong concern of his was
that tensions between the European colonial powers and the oppressed observed
before the Second World War would threaten the stability of the postwar world.
According to a memorandum of Charles W. Taussig, Adviser on Caribbean Affairs,
Roosevelt said in March 1945 that “he was concerned about the brown people in the
East. He said that there are 1,100,000,000 brown people. In many Eastern countries,
they are ruled by a handful of whites and they resent it. Our goal must be to help
them achieve independence – 1,100,000,000 potential enemies are dangerous.”36)
Previous studies have pointed out that Wilsonʼs efforts to promote the idea of
national self-determination during the First World War influenced Rooseveltʼs
world views and motivated him to adopt an anti-imperialistic policy.37) That might
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have been the case, but it should be noted that Rooseveltʼs anti-imperialist policy
was different from Wilsonʼs in terms of its applicability. Wilson regarded the idea
of national self-determination as being primarily applicable to European peoples.
Therefore, he did not resist British and French endeavors to make the mandate
system of the League of Nations applicable only to colonies or territories of
Germany and Turkey, the countries defeated in the First World War.
Based on his strong awareness of racial tensions in the European colonies,
Roosevelt, by contrast, considered that the idea of national self-determination
should be positively applied to not only European peoples but also non-European
counterparts. In this regard, he differed with Churchill over the interpretation of
Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter̶it provides that the United States and United
Kingdom “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under
which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government
restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” Churchill had argued
in his testimony in the House of Commons that this stipulation should be applied to
European peoples only because he and Roosevelt at the Atlantic meeting “had in
mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life
of the states and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke.”38) On the contrary,
Roosevelt considered that the stipulation should be applied to “all peoples” literally,
saying in a statement in February 1942 that “[t]he Atlantic Charter applies not only
to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic but to the whole world.”39)
It should be noted, however, that Rooseveltʼs idea of national self-
determination included a distinction between Europe and the others in that
oppressed peoples in the latter areas were planned to be put under international
trusteeship. Roosevelt thought that those outside Europe must be guided by mature
countries because they could pose a serious threat to white peoples, even though
they were immature at the moment due to long-term foreign rules.40)
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As mentioned above, it was France that Roosevelt set as the main target of his
anti-colonial policy. In early 1942, Roosevelt created Chinaʼs theater, where
Chiang Kai-shek would serve as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces,
and incorporated French Indochina in it. This means that Allied forces, including
French troops, could not enter French Indochina without Chiang Kai-shekʼs
permission, and they would be placed under his command on entering.41) It was
expected that this mechanism would make it difficult for the French Empire to
reestablish its control in Indochina because Chiang Kai-shek, with Chinaʼs history
of suffering under European and Japanese imperialism as a background, had taken
a negative stance on the survival of the colonial empire.
Roosevelt foresaw that the collapse of the French Empire in Indochina would
shake other European rules in Asia. Their Asian colonies are “all interrelated,”
Roosevelt told his son during the war. “If one gets its freedom, the others will get
ideas.”42) Based on this remark, it can be said that China was supposed to play an
important role in expelling European colonial powers from Asia.
China was also expected to function as a power to block the expansion of the
Soviet power in East Asia. In early 1943, Roosevelt said to the Under Secretary of
State Sumner Welles that “[a] stable China, recognized as one of the great powers,
would, he believed, be a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Far East.”43) In March of
the same year, he also said to Eden that he felt that “China, in any serious conflict
of policy with Russia, would undoubtedly line up on our side.”44)
Finally, China was expected to contribute to the reconstruction and prosperity
of Asia under a free trade regime promoted by the United States. In September
1944, Donald M. Nelson, the former director of the War Production Board, visited
Moscow on the way to Chongqing to investigate Chinese economy, and told
Molotov that China would “supply the peoples of the Near and Far East with their
requirements formerly supplied by the Japanese.”45)
4. China as a Junior Partner
Roosevelt pinned many hopes on China. That said, he never rated its
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economic and political situations highly, confessing to Stalin at the Tehran
Conference that he realized “the weakness of China at present.”46) It was a well-
known fact that China lagged far behind Western countries and Japan in terms of
modernization. China also had a problem of internal strife between the Kuomintang
and Chinese Communist Party. In a meeting with Molotov in May 1942, Roosevelt
revealed his idea of making the realization of “a unified central government” a
condition China should meet before becoming one of the four policemen.47)
However, Roosevelt did not wait for China to fulfill this condition for several
reasons. First, there were no other Asian nations that could play the regional roles
that he expected of China. Second, Roosevelt was concerned that failure to include
China in the “great power club” could give rise to the charge “that the white races
were undertaking to dominate the world.”48) Third, Roosevelt rated Chinaʼs
potential power highly. When Churchill had stayed at the White House
immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack by Japan and told Roosevelt how much
he felt “American opinion over-estimated the contribution which China could make
to the general war,” Roosevelt had differed strongly and said, “[t]here were five
hundred million people in China. What would happen if this enormous population
developed in the same way as Japan had done in the last century and got hold of
modern weapons?”49)
As this conversation with Churchill shows, Rooseveltʼs high regard for
Chinaʼs potential was based on his view of population as a major source of
national power. To be sure, his remarks about the size of Chinaʼs population were
not constant, such as saying five hundred million or four hundred million. During
the war, however, Roosevelt consistently rated Chinaʼs potential highly based on
its huge population.
In this regard, a pundit interestingly sees the impact of the Yellow Peril on
Rooseveltʼs view of China.50) Roosevelt was reared at the turn of the century, when
the Yellow Peril became increasingly prevalent in Western societies. He was also a
fan of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was a proponent of the Yellow Peril. What
Mahan perceived as a main threat to Western societies from his long-term
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perspective was Chinese people. He wrote in his book The Problem of Asia as
follows:
“[I]t is difficult to contemplate with equanimity such a vast mass as the four hundred
millions of China concentrated into one effective political organization, equipped with
modern appliances, and cooped within a territory already narrow for it.51)
It is quite possible that Mahanʼs arguments about the Yellow Peril were
aroused in Rooseveltʼs mind by his strong awareness of race during the Second
World War, and then, had a certain impact on his postwar visions. Previous studies
have pointed out that Rooseveltʼs pro-Chinese sentiment nurtured in relation to his
grandfather, who had made a huge fortune in trade with China, was an important
source of his postwar vision of making China a great power. This might be the
case, but the perception of China as a threat rather than such a lukewarm feeling
toward it should be emphasized as a factor that defined Rooseveltʼs vision of China.
In his book, Mahan argues that “a process has begun which must end either
in bringing the Eastern and Western civilizations face to face, as opponents who
have nothing in common, or else in receiving the new elements, the Chinese
especially,” into our civilization.52) Rooseveltʼs vision of China was clearly to
pursue the latter course. Behind that choice, there was also a consideration that it
would be “easier to influence Chinaʼs development internationally and internally if
she were on the inside of any special relationship among the big Powers than if she
were on the outside.”53) Moreover, Rooseveltʼs vision of China aimed to build long-
term and stable relationships with all of Asiaʼs colored peoples, which were
estimated at 1,100,000,000. In January 1943, Roosevelt told Welles about the aim
as follows:
[T]he Western world, for its own safetyʼs sake, must abandon once and for all the idea
that the Asiatic peoples were inferior races, and must work wholeheartedly with China
from the outset as the best means of preventing a fundamental cleavage between the
West and the East in the years to come.54)
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If we judge from these words that Roosevelt positioned China as an equal
partner, we would be misunderstanding the essence of his postwar vision of China.
His vision put China on an equal footing in form with the United States, Britain
and the Soviet Union, to be sure. However, it should be noted, his perception of
colored peoples as a threat was closely connected to his patriarchal view of them,
as clearly observed in his plan of international trusteeship. Given Rooseveltʼs low
evaluation of Chinaʼs situation, it is unlikely that Chinese people were outside the
scope of his patriarchal thinking. Therefore, the above-mentioned view that it
would be “easier to influence Chinaʼs development” “if she were on the inside of
any special relationship among the big Powers” should be understood not only as a
reflection of Rooseveltʼs perception of China as a threat but also as a manifestation
of his patriarchal thinking toward Chinese people. For Roosevelt, China was a
nation that needed to be given special treatment due to its usefulness and potential
but, at the same time, had to be guided for progress. In this sense, China was
positioned lower than the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union.
In fact, the Chinese government was rarely given opportunities to discuss with
these countries postwar order issues such as the creation of a universal international
organization. Even military strategies against the Axis powers were often decided
without consulting the Chinese government. Chiang Kai-shek was dissatisfied with
this and repeatedly urged the United States to allow China to join the Combined
Chiefs of Staff comprising American and British representatives.55) However, his
appeal was never accepted.
After all, Rooseveltʼs postwar vision was to position China as a junior partner
for the time being, at least until China achieved unification and modernization.
Furthermore, given that the United States was to be a policeman in East Asia, it
can be said that Roosevelt sought to establish an American hegemonic order in the
region. His postwar vision was to reproduce the Western Hemispheric order in East
Asia more comprehensively than in other regions.
The postwar base plan, JCS570/2, clearly reflected this vision of his.
According to the plan, the United States was to set up a number of military bases
in wide areas extending from the Western Hemisphere to East Asia.56)
Making China a Great Power54
55) For example, see FRUS: 1942, China (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956), pp.33-34; Maurice
Matloff and E. M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941 – 1942 (Washington,
DC: Center of Military History, 1999), p.205; and Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang
Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2009), p.235.
56) See Stacie L. Pettyjohn, U.S. Global Defense Posture, 1783 – 2011 (Santa Monica, CA: →
Technically, JCS570/2 was a base plan applicable just for the period until a
universal international organization was established. Moreover, it was created only
for the air force.
However, the JCS believed that JCS570/2 would be “a sound basis” on which
to build a permanent base system in the future.57) In January 1944, Roosevelt sent a
letter to Hull and ordered him to “initiate negotiations with the government
concerned to acquire permanent or long-term benefit of the bases, facilities and
rights required, at the earliest possible moment.”58) The following month, Roosevelt
sent another letter to Hull and instructed him that the State Department, in their
negotiations with foreign governments, “will not limit themselves to the subject of
air bases alone, but will consider the related questions of adequate base facilities
for naval and ground forces.”59)
It was the Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, who took charge of
diplomatic negotiations on the base issue. He wrote in his diary about JCS570/2 as
follows:
It is quite a proposition, and in a sense tends to delimit what might be called the
“American Empire.”60)
5. Conclusion
During the Second World War, President Roosevelt sought to make China,
along with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, one of the so-called
Four Policemen. Taking the American good neighbor policy as a model, China was
supposed to take the responsibility of establishing a stable and open international
order in postwar East Asia. It should be noted, however, that Roosevelt neither
positioned China as an equal partner, as Hullʼs memoir describes, nor intended to
allow it to make East Asia its sphere of influence, as Spellmanʼs memorandum
reports. According to Rooseveltʼs postwar vision, the United States was to continue
handling Asian affairs after the war and be the dominant power in the region for
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the time being, at least until China achieved unification and modernization. In
short, Rooseveltʼs postwar vision of China was to prepare for the possibility of
China becoming a real great power while, at the time, positioning it as a junior
partner and aiming to expand American hegemony from the Western Hemisphere
to East Asia.
In his book published in 2017, Asia specialist Michael J. Green argues that
“[i]f there is one central theme in American strategic culture as it has applied to the
Far East over time, it is that the United States will not tolerate any other power
establishing exclusive hegemonic control over Asia or the Pacific.” “Put another
way,” he continues, “for over two centuries, the national interest of the United
States has been identified by key leaders as ensuring that the Pacific Ocean
remains a conduit for American ideas and goods to flow westward, and not for
threats to flow eastward toward the homeland.”61) This argument applies to
Rooseveltʼs postwar vision of making China a great power, though Green does not
explore it in detail.
After the Second World War, Rooseveltʼs postwar vision of China collapsed
due to the outbreak of civil war in China and the victory of the Chinese
Communist Party. Nevertheless, American interests in East Asia did not diminish,
forming the Cold War strategy in the region. Positioned as a junior partner in that
strategy was Japan.
Postwar Japan has been an ideal junior partner for the United States. Unlike
China, which fell into a civil war, Japan has maintained its domestic stability well,
and also unlike China, which is under communist rule, Japan has been willing to
accept American military presence in Asia; in spite of its enormous power, it has
developed restrained diplomacy that can be called good neighbor diplomacy. It is
true that China has become a great power in a real sense, but its recent
international behavior makes it hard to avoid the impression that it is much
different from the China Roosevelt had envisioned as one of the four policemen.
His postwar vision of China during the Second World War implies that there
would be less possibility of the United States abolishing its Japan-centered East
Asia policy and pursuing a bipolar condominium with China as we see it today.
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